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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF BROWN

DAVID A. STRAUSS*
Today, Brown v. Board of Education1 is an icon. Its legal soundness is, for
all practical purposes, beyond question. Brown, of course, was the Supreme
Court decision holding unconstitutional state-enforced racial segregation in
public schools. There are academic critics of Brown, but then there are
academic critics of pretty much everything. As far as mainstream legal
thought is concerned, the lawfulness of Brown is a fixed point. One can only
imagine what would happen if, for example, a nominee for the Supreme Court
testified, in his Senate confirmation hearings, that he thought Brown was
wrong and should be overruled: The hearing would effectively end on the spot,
because the nominee’s chances of being confirmed would be zero. In fact it is
doubtful that a nominee who was even equivocal in his or her support of
Brown could survive. On the level of theory, too, it is understood all around
that if a theory of constitutional interpretation is inconsistent with Brown, the
theory goes and Brown stays. Brown is quite clearly inconsistent with the
original understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example. But
defenders of the theory that the Constitution must be interpreted according to
the original understandings contrive ways to explain how that theory, properly
conceived, is consistent with Brown. With very rare exceptions, they do not
question Brown.
The latest, impressive demonstration of Brown’s iconic status occurred last
year, in the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community
Parents Involved held
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.2
unconstitutional the efforts of the local school boards in Seattle, Washington,
and Louisville, Kentucky, to alleviate racial homogeneity in their schools. All
of the Justices, on all sides of the issue, claimed to be faithful to the true

* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This
Article is adapted from the Richard J. Childress Lecture, delivered at Saint Louis University
School of Law on October 5, 2007. I am very grateful to the distinguished speakers whose
comments on this Lecture appear in this volume; to Joel K. Goldstein, Dean Jeffrey E. Lewis, and
the faculty of the School of Law for the invitation, their substantive comments, and their generous
hospitality; and to Sarah Mullen-Dominguez and the other editors of the Law Journal for their
indispensable help and support.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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principles of Brown.3 Justices on the current Supreme Court who are willing
to overrule important precedents in almost any other area of constitutional
law—the Establishment Clause, the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment,
the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause,
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause—those Justices not only leave
Brown alone; they claim to venerate it. The battle over the proper
interpretation of the Constitution’s prohibition on racial discrimination has
become a battle over the legacy of Brown.
Brown did not always have this untouchable status. Unsurprisingly,
segregationists attacked Brown as a lawless act of judicial usurpation. But
Brown also had serious, thoughtful critics among people who were opposed to
segregation. Some of those critics, too, said that Brown was a lawless act or
was misguided in other respects. Today, Brown’s iconic status has caused this
good-faith, non-segregationist criticism of Brown to become a lost chapter, or
at least an underappreciated chapter, in the intellectual history of constitutional
law in the twentieth century.
That is unfortunate; these criticisms of Brown, offered by people who
opposed racial segregation, deserve to be taken seriously. That is not because
Brown should be anything less than a fixed point. The legality of Brown is,
and should be, as solid a principle as anything in American constitutional law.
The reason for coming to grips with these critics of Brown is precisely to
understand what Brown stands for. Brown—or, more precisely, its status as a
fixed point in American constitutional law—emerged from an intense, bitter
struggle. That struggle had an intellectual dimension, as well as a political
(and a brute force) dimension. At a time when there are competing views of
the legacy of Brown, it is worth trying to understand which ideas prevailed in
that struggle and which were rejected.
The fiftieth anniversary of Cooper v. Aaron4 is an especially good time to
ask these questions, because the Little Rock school integration crisis that led to
Cooper was a turning point. In the decade following Brown, public opinion,
particularly in the North, changed substantially. Immediately after Brown,
while polls suggest that a bare majority of the population approved of what the
Supreme Court had done, popular support for Brown and for desegregation
generally was lukewarm, at best.5 The halfhearted support of a narrow
national majority was no match for the intense opposition to Brown in the
region that was most affected. But during the next decade, support for the civil

3. See id. at 2767–2768; id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]y view was the rallying
cry for lawyers who litigated Brown.”); id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2800
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 343 (2004).
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rights movement increased in the North in both numbers and intensity. That
made possible the civil right legislation of the mid-1960s. In large part this
change in Northern sentiment happened because the true nature of racial
apartheid became more visible, and it became impossible for many Northerners
to indulge the idea that racial segregation was an essentially benign system. It
became too clear to be denied that segregation treated blacks as inferior in a
way that was unacceptable.
Little Rock was a critical step in that development. The Court’s reaction to
Little Rock, in Cooper v. Aaron, suggested that the Court, too, had moved
beyond the uncertainty about the soundness of Brown that some of the Justices
felt when that case was decided. Little Rock was one of the first occasions on
which Northerners could see, firsthand, the viciousness and brutality that was
always latent in segregation. It was an important step toward the widespread
acceptance of the civil rights movement and, concomitantly, of Brown itself.6
Little Rock showed the national audience that segregation was a part of a
racial caste system that treated African Americans as an inferior race. That
was why Brown was correct; that was why “separate” could not possibly be
“equal.” The defenders of Brown understood that: the Court said as much in
its opinion in Brown.7 The non-segregationist critics of Brown denied that the
Court was entitled to draw that conclusion about segregation.8 That is the
position that was eventually repudiated in the decades following Brown and
that led to the unquestioned status that Brown enjoys today.
In the immediate aftermath of Brown, when the debate over its legitimacy
was still very much alive, everyone—defenders and critics alike—understood
that it was not enough just to assert that lines cannot be drawn on the basis of
race. You have to explain why race is an improper basis for classifying people.
In the context of the American South in the mid-twentieth century, the
explanation—accepted by some, rejected by others—was that segregation
treated blacks as inferior.9 That account—that explanation—is what prevailed
in the next decade, as Brown moved toward its current iconic status.
Since affirmative action became an issue in the mid-1970s, a different
account of Brown has started to emerge. On that account, Brown was not
about racial subordination or oppression, or even about treating certain groups

6. See generally TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER V. AARON AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1–3 (2007).
7. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483, 493–94 (1954) (“To separate [children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491–92 (noting that in contemporary cases, “inequality was
found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the
same educational qualification”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1068

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1065

as inferior. It was about using race as a criterion, at all. This view was urged
with particular fervor by four Justices in the Parents Involved case.10 One
reason for trying to recover the history—the controversy over Brown’s
correctness, the resolution of the controversy, and the role that violent
incidents like Little Rock and the decision in Cooper v. Aaron played in the
resolution of that controversy—is that it should enable us to see that these
revisionist efforts to say that Brown was simply about the use of race are, in a
word, indefensible.
I. THE BROWN DECISION AND ITS CRITICS
A.

The Decision

Brown was the culmination of a systematic legal campaign by the
NAACP.11 When that campaign began, so-called Jim Crow laws, enforcing
racial segregation, were ubiquitous in the South and not unknown elsewhere.12
These laws were defended in court on the ground that while they separated the
races, they did not treat anyone unequally; since the Constitution only required
equality, segregation was not per se unconstitutional.13 The object of the
NAACP campaign was to abolish segregation by overturning this doctrine of
“separate but equal.”14 Plessy v. Ferguson, an 1896 decision upholding a
Louisiana statute that required segregation in public transportation, was the
case most closely identified with the regime of separate but equal.15
The idea that separate could be equal was a sham, as we have come to
recognize today. At the time, though, it was not treated as such by the Court:
the Court accepted segregation but, formally at least, the Court did not accept
inequality.16 The idea that the races had to be treated equally was the law of
the land throughout the time that Jim Crow segregation was practiced in the

10. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2767 (2007) (plurality opinion).
11. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); see generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(1975); Eva Paterson et al., Equal Justice— Same Vision in a New Day, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 22 (2005) (discussing the legal campaign waged by the NAACP).
12. See, e.g., Olympia Duhart, A Native Son’s Defense: Bigger Thomas and Diminished
Capacity, 49 HOW. L.J. 61, 65–71 (2005) (addressing the Jim Crow Era in the United States);
Paul Finkelman, The Radicalism of Brown, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 35, 41–45 (2004) (discussing the
pervasiveness of segregation laws and practices in the South).
13. Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor
Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1473 (2005).
14. Id. at 1473–83 (discussing the NAACP’s fight against the “separate but equal” doctrine).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
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South. In 1880, in Strauder v. West Virginia,17 the Court had held that West
Virginia violated the Equal Protection Clause when it excluded blacks from
jury service.18 The Court said, among other things, that “the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons.”19 As for the
West Virginia statute, the Court concluded that
[t]he very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors,
because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects
fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, [and] an
20
assertion of their inferiority . . . .

Plessy did not overrule Strauder, or even question it. Plessy upheld
segregation because, the Court concluded, so long as facilities were equal,
separating the races in and of itself—unlike excluding blacks from jury
service—did not brand African Americans as inferior.21 The Court justified
this conclusion in a passage that has become one of the most notorious in
American constitutional law:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
22
construction upon it.

As disingenuous as that passage is, it is worth thinking about what it says.
The Court acknowledged that the issue is equality23: the Court did not deny
that African Americans are entitled to be treated equally with whites.24 The
reason it rejected the attack on the Louisiana statute was that it did not believe
(or at least it said it did not believe) that the statute treated blacks unequally.25
In 1914, at a time when Plessy was firmly established as the law (and when
American race relations were near their post-Civil War nadir), the Court
invalidated an Oklahoma statute that mandated separate but equal facilities but
allowed railroads to carry whites-only sleeping, dining, and chair cars.26
Oklahoma’s defense of the statute was that there was insufficient demand from

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 308.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 543.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 151, 164 (1914).
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African Americans for those kinds of cars.27 The Court struck this statute
down on the ground that it did not give African Americans equal facilities.28
So however blind the Court was to the nature of segregation, its commitment
to equality was at least nominal, and at times a little more than that.
Brown did not formally overrule Plessy. Much of the discussion in the
Brown opinion concerned education.29 It was not obvious that the logic of
Brown would extend to public transportation, although the Court soon made it
clear that Brown was not limited to education but invalidated state-mandated
segregation generally.30 But although Brown did not formally overrule Plessy,
it squarely took on the claim, central to Plessy, that segregation did not
necessarily denote inferiority. The Court characterized the question in the case
as: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?
We believe that it does.”31 And the Brown Court uttered its famous line,
rejecting Plessy’s infamous claim: “To separate [grade school children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”32
B.

The Critics

The most thoughtful critics of Brown took aim directly at the proposition
that segregation denoted inferiority. Or, to be more precise, they took aim at
the idea that the Court was entitled to strike down state legislation on the basis
of the Court’s own conclusion on this point. The most celebrated of these
critics, in legal circles at least, was Herbert Wechsler, who attacked Brown in
his 1959 essay Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law.33
Wechsler’s essay began with a defense of judicial review against even
more radical attacks that questioned whether the courts are ever entitled to hold
that a statute violates a substantive provision of the Constitution.34 Wechsler’s
argument was that the courts did have the legitimate power to do so, but only if

27. Id. at 161.
28. Id. at 161–62.
29. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (holding state statute
requiring segregation of races in prisons and jails unconstitutional); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S.
61, 62 (1963) (holding states may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities).
31. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
32. Id. at 494.
33. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959), reprinted in HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3
(1961).
34. Id. at 4–15.
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they acted in a principled fashion: if the basis of their decisions could be
consistently applied to other cases in which the parties and interests at stake
might be different.35 If the Supreme Court did not act in a way that was
consistent with “neutral principles,” then it was merely a “naked power organ”
that was not exercising legitimate authority. 36
Wechsler’s criticism of Brown has become infamous for being obtuse—
which it is—but his criticism was neither superficial nor badly motivated.
Wechsler went out of his way to say that Brown and other cases that struck at
Jim Crow apartheid “have the best chance of making an enduring contribution
to the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years.”37 These were
not idle sentiments. Wechsler was a committed opponent of segregation; he
had, among many other things, helped the NAACP lawyers prepare for the
Supreme Court argument in Brown (asking many of the same questions that
later formed the basis for his article).38 Wechsler also distanced himself from
those who criticized Brown because it was difficult to reconcile with the
original understandings, because it overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, or because
it aroused strident and widespread opposition among some members of the
public.39
Wechsler said that the problem with Brown was that it could not be
justified on the basis of “neutral principles.”40 Stated in that way, the criticism
seems obscure, or even slightly ridiculous. Of course it is possible to state a
principle that justifies Brown and that could be applied consistently in future
cases. As John Hart Ely said, “How about ‘No racial segregation, ever’?”.41
Wechsler did not help matters by celebrating the “enigmatic overtones” of the
word “neutral.”42 As a number of people pointed out in response to Wechsler,
it was never clear, in his account, what criteria were to be used in determining
when a principle was neutral and when it was not.43
Wechsler’s real criticism of Brown—the one that, mistaken though it is,
deserves to be taken seriously—did not actually have much to do with
principles. His point was that the defenders of Brown had to meet the
challenge laid down by Plessy. They had to explain why segregation
necessarily entailed inequality. The decision in Brown, Wechsler said, “must
have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of

35. Id. at 16–17, 21–23.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 37.
38. See KLUGER, supra note 11, at 529–30.
39. See WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 43–44.
40. Id. at 47.
41. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 55 (1980).
42. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at xiii.
43. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804–07 (1983).
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equality to the minority against whom it is directed.”44 But what was the
answer to Plessy’s (now-notorious) dictum, which Wechsler quoted, that the
“badge of inferiority” exists only because members of the minority group
“choose ‘to put that construction upon it’?”.45
Interpreted most charitably, Wechsler’s criticism of Brown was that the
Supreme Court was not in a position to make the judgment that segregation, as
it was practiced at those times and in those places, branded blacks as inferior.
This was in large measure an empirical judgment, a sociological and
psychological judgment about the role that segregation played in a society.46
Brown’s defenders responded in the same terms, arguing that the truth of that
judgment was apparent to anyone acquainted with the institution of segregation
in the South.47 This was a debate worth having—not because there was any
doubt, really, about the nature of segregation, but because it is worth asking the
question about the capacity of courts to make judgments of that kind. In the
specific case of Brown, the Court was entitled to be confident in its judgment
about the nature of segregation. But Wechsler’s more general concern—how
far are we willing to go in licensing the courts to strike down laws on the basis
of the judges’ conclusions about those laws’ social and psychological
effects?—is a legitimate question to ask, even if the answer in Brown was
clear.
In any event, the answer in Brown was clear, or at least so we all—the
legal culture and society at large—came to conclude. Brown was right about
the nature of segregation; Wechsler was wrong to suggest that this was a
judgment that could not be justified.48 The Court acted lawfully in making the
judgment it did about segregation. The central point, though, is to be clear on
what that judgment was—on what was at stake in the debate about the legal
soundness of Brown. The question was whether segregation, of the kind
practiced at the time, necessarily treated African Americans as inferior, and
whether the Supreme Court was entitled to make that judgment. The answer
was yes, to both. But that was what was wrong with segregation: it treated
blacks as inferior. There was no other possible answer to Plessy, or to
Wechsler.
Wechsler said that his own view was that the issue in Brown was freedom
of association. If there was a constitutional problem with segregation, he said,
it was that segregation prevented blacks and whites from associating with each

44. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 45.
45. Id. at 46 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551(1896)).
46. See id. at 44–45.
47. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 424 (1960).
48. See WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 46–47.
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other.49 On the other hand, Brown’s abolition of segregation forced people to
associate with others whom they would rather avoid, and that was also an
infringement on freedom of association.50 Wechsler said he could see no
principled basis for choosing between these two outcomes, and that therefore
Brown should not have disturbed the choice made by the states.51 (Wechsler’s
argument about freedom of association actually anticipates the Supreme
Court’s decision, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which held that New
Jersey violated the Constitution when its civil rights laws forbade the Boy
Scouts from discriminating against gays.52 But that is another story.)
Wechsler did conclude, consistent with his premises, that laws forbidding
interracial marriage should be unconstitutional, since they necessarily forbade
associations between willing individuals.53 He criticized the Court for ducking
that issue,54 which the Court did—in essentially lawless fashion—in 195655
and only finally resolved more than a decade later.56 But because school
segregation infringed the associational rights of blacks and whites
symmetrically, according to Wechsler, he saw no basis for Brown in any
constitutional right to freedom of association.57
This argument about freedom of association was, in a way, just another
echo of the Plessy-like claim that there is no basis for concluding that
segregation imposed distinctive burdens on blacks.
The widespread
acceptance of Brown constituted a rejection of that position, too. So, to sum
up, Wechsler advanced two related claims in his criticism of Brown: that
segregation did not brand blacks as inferior, and that the burdens of
segregation were distributed symmetrically between blacks and whites. The
acceptance of Brown meant that both of those positions were rejected.
Wechsler’s criticism of Brown came after the events at Little Rock, but he
went out of his way to say that there was no justification for the “defiance of

49. Id. (“For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segregation
is not one of discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely
elsewhere, in the denial by the state of rreedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same
way on any groups or races that may be involved.”).
50. Id. at 47.
51. Id.
52. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
53. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 46–47.
54. Id. at 46–47 (“I take no pride in knowing that in 1956 the Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal in a case in which Virginia nullified a marriage on this ground, a case in which the statute
had been squarely challenged by the defendant, and the Court . . . dismissed per curiam on
procedural grounds that I make bold to say are wholly without basis in the law.”).
55. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956), dismissing appeal from Naim v. Naim, 90
S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956). For a discussion, see KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 321–23.
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 47.
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the courts”; that was “the antithesis of law.”58 An even more celebrated critic,
though, took Little Rock as her starting point, and expressed considerable
sympathy for those who defied the courts.59
Hannah Arendt was a philosopher who fled from Germany to escape Nazi
persecution and later wrote extensively on issues of political authority and
totalitarianism, among other things.60 The central argument of Arendt’s essay,
Reflections on Little Rock, was that the schools should not have been the arena
in which the battle for desegregation was fought.61 Upon seeing the
photographs in the newspapers of African American children being harassed
for trying to attend school in Little Rock, Arendt said:
My first question was, what would I do if I were a Negro mother? The answer:
under no circumstances would I expose my child to conditions which made it
appear as though it wanted to push its way into a group where it was not
wanted. Psychologically, the situation of being unwanted (a typically social
predicament) is more difficult to bear than outright persecution (a political
62
predicament) because personal pride is involved.

Then, Arendt said:
My second question was: what would I do if I were a white mother in the
South? Again I would try to prevent my child’s being dragged into a political
battle in the schoolyard. In addition, I would feel that my consent was
necessary for any such drastic changes no matter what my opinion of them
happened to be. . . . I would deny that the government had any right to tell me
63
in whose company my child received its instruction.

Her essay on Little Rock at times shows an astonishing degree of sympathy for
whites in the segregated states: “To force parents to send their children to an
integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which
clearly belong to them in all free societies—the private right over their children
and the social right to free association.”64
Considering the source, especially, these sentiments are remarkable. But
in its basic approach, Arendt’s argument echoed both Wechsler’s essay and the
Plessy opinion. Like Wechsler, Arendt saw the issue in large part as one of

58. Id.
59. HANNAH ARENDT, Reflections on Little Rock, in RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 193–
213 (2003). Refelctions on Little Rock was originally published in 1959.
60. See Jerome Kohn, A Note on the Text to ARENDT, supra note 59, at xxxi; Jerome Kohn,
Introduction to ARENDT, supra note 59, at xix.
61. See ARENDT, supra note 59, at 213 (“Hence it seems highly questionable whether it was
wise to begin enforcement of civil rights in a domain where no basic human and no basic political
right is at stake, and where other rights—social and private—whose protection is no less vital,
can so easily be hurt.”).
62. Id. at 193.
63. Id. at 195.
64. Id. at 212.
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freedom of association, as her remarks about the schoolchildren suggest. She
did not question that African Americans were entitled to be treated as equals.
But she believed that equality was a norm that applied only in the public
sphere65 (and she apparently believed that the public schools were not part of
the public sphere). In their private affairs, people were entitled to discriminate;
they did not have to treat everyone equally, and indeed a requirement of
equality would amount to an abolition of much of private life.66 Freedom of
association, in that sense, trumped equality.
Consistent with the view that the issue was freedom of association, Arendt,
even more vehemently than Wechsler, denounced laws forbidding interracial
marriage; she called them “the most outrageous law[s] of [the] Southern
states”67 and, somewhat implausibly, “what the whole world knows to be the
most outrageous piece of legislation in the whole Western Hemisphere . . . .”68
At the same time, though, Arendt said that “[t]he real issue is equality before
the law of the country, and equality is violated by segregation laws, that is, by
laws enforcing segregation, not by social customs and the manners of
educating children.”69 She seemed to believe (and in this respect echoed
another theme of Plessy) that the laws that segregated public schools were
epiphenomena of social and cultural norms and so should not be regarded as
acts of the government.
These, then, were the views of these thoughtful, well-intentioned critics of
Brown: Segregation in the schools did not produce inequality—either no
inequality at all, or no inequality of the kind that the courts should try to
eliminate. Segregation did interfere with freedom of association, but in that
respect its effects were symmetrical: both blacks and whites suffered.
Moreover, putting aside interracial marriage, desegregation—Brown itself—
was as much of a threat to associational freedom as the Jim Crow laws were.
To today’s sensibilities these sentiments seem either naïve or morally
obtuse. And these are the views that must be rejected if Brown is to be
accepted. But one sentence of Arendt’s encapsulates the reasons that it is
worth revisiting this debate. In the wake of Little Rock, she endorsed the view
that “enforced integration is no better than enforced segregation.”70 So baldly
stated, that view seems shocking, especially coming from someone known for
wisdom and perspicuity. But it is really just the position of the Supreme Court
Justices who equated the integrationist efforts in Parents Involved with the
enforced segregation struck down by Brown.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 199–200, 203, 205–06.
ARENDT, supra note 59, at 205–06.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 202.
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II. LITTLE ROCK, COOPER V. AARON, AND THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC OPINION
The Little Rock school crisis began fifty years ago. It was a strange series
of events in many ways. Neither the city of Little Rock nor the state of
Arkansas was rigidly segregated, and neither was the site of particularly
outspoken opposition to Brown.71 African Americans had attended the
University of Arkansas even before Brown.72 In the years immediately after
Brown, when whites in much of the Deep South were united in their defiance
of the Supreme Court, several Arkansas school districts made plans to
desegregate, and African Americans enrolled in five of the six previously allwhite state colleges.73 Little Rock itself had a reputation for being relatively
progressive on racial issues.74
Consistent with that reputation, the Little Rock District School Board
announced, just three days after Brown was decided, that it intended to comply
with the Supreme Court’s decision.75 A year later, the School Board
announced a plan for desegregation, beginning in the high school in the fall of
1957 and concluding with the complete desegregation of the school system by
1963.76 The School Board announced this plan even before the Court’s second
Brown decision,77 which specifically addressed the remedial issues left open by
Brown I and which became famous (or notorious) for saying that school
districts were to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”78 African American
groups challenged the Little Rock School Board’s plan on the ground that it
moved too slowly, but they lost their case in the district court and the court of
appeals and did not seek Supreme Court review.79 The School Board notified
nine African American children that they were to be admitted to Central High
School in Little Rock in September 1957.80
While the local authorities in Little Rock were proceeding in this cautious
way toward desegregation, Governor Orval Faubus and the state legislature
had other plans.81 The state constitution was amended to require the legislature

71. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 88–89 (1979) (“Arkansas, though opposed to integration was
not the Deep South . . . . Little Rock, especially, did not seem the place for racial politics to
prosper . . . . [and] nobody expected unusual trouble.”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 89.
74. See id. 88–89 (“And Little Rock, especially, did not seem the place for racial politics to
prosper.”).
75. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id.
78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
79. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8.
80. Id. at 9.
81. For a definitive account of these events, see FREYER, supra note 6, at 13–134.
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to resist “in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional desegregation
decisions” in Brown I and Brown II.82 The Arkansas General Assembly
rescinded school compulsory attendance laws to the extent that they required
attendance at racially mixed schools.83
On September 2, 1957—the day before the African American children
were to begin at the high school—Governor Faubus sent National Guard troops
to the high school and announced that the school was “off limits” to the black
children.84 On September 3, the federal district court ordered the school board
to proceed with the integration plan.85 But the next day, when the children
tried to enter the school, the National Guard troops “stood shoulder to shoulder
at the school grounds” and prevented them from doing so.86 The National
Guard troops continued to do this for the next three weeks, until the district
court, on the application of the federal government, entered an injunction
forbidding the Governor from obstructing the desegregation plan.87
It was clear at the time, and has become even clearer in retrospect, that the
confrontation was precipitated by Governor Faubus for reasons that were
entirely opportunistic.88 Faubus himself was, by the standards of Southern
politicians at the time, a racial moderate who had defeated outright race-baiters
in previous elections.89 But he was afraid of another challenge from diehard
segregationists, and he apparently did what he did at Little Rock for that
reason. Faubus’s justification for his actions—that it would “not be possible to
restore or to maintain order if forcible integration is carried out” at Central
High—was, by all the evidence, totally specious.90 No local authorities asked
for the Governor’s help, and no state official consulted with the local
authorities before dispatching the Guard.91 The district court found, in
subsequent proceedings, that before Faubus called out the National Guard, “no
crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or
threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had
occurred.”92
But Faubus’s actions released the evil genie. The Little Rock school board
explained to the Supreme Court that

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id.; see WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 89.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 6, at 142–43; WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 88–90.
WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 88.
Id. at 89–90.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 9 (quoting Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225 (E.D. Ark. 1957)).
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[t]he effect of [Faubus’s] action . . . was to harden the core of opposition to the
Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluctantly accepted the
Plan to believe that there was some power in the State of Arkansas which,
when exerted, could nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the
decree of [the] [District] Court, and from that date hostility to the Plan was
increased and criticism of the officials of the [School Board] . . . bec[a]me
93
more bitter and unrestrained.

When the district court entered an injunction against the Governor, and the
African American students were admitted to the school on September 23, they
were met by a hostile mob. That same day the students were withdrawn from
the school by the Little Rock police out of concern for their safety.94
Two days later, President Eisenhower ordered a thousand paratroopers to
Little Rock and placed the National Guard under federal command.95 The
students were admitted to the school, and federal troops remained at the school
for two months.96 The federalized National Guard stayed there for the entire
school year.97 By all accounts, the year was a miserable one for the African
American students. They were ostracized and abused, and “[g]angs of
segregationist toughs” not only harassed the black students, sometimes
violently, but threatened any white students who showed signs of befriending
them.98
In February of 1958, the Little Rock school board asked the district court
for permission to withdraw the African American students from the high
school and to postpone the implementation of the desegregation plan for two
and a half years.99 The school board argued that the public hostility to
desegregation made it impossible to operate the school.100 The district court,
after a hearing, found that conditions in Central High School were
characterized by “chaos, bedlam and turmoil” and were marked by threats and
violent incidents directed against the black students and, on occasion, school
authorities.101 The district court concluded that the situation was “intolerable”
and granted the relief that the board had requested.102 The court of appeals
reversed,103 and the Supreme Court heard the case—Cooper v. Aaron—on a
highly expedited basis, holding a special session of the Court in mid-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12; WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 90.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
Id.
WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 90–91.
Id. at 91.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 13 (quoting Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 21 (E.D. Ark. 1958)).
Id.
Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958).
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September 1958, so that the matter could be resolved before the school year
began.104
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment on the day
after it heard argument, and then, two weeks later, rendered an extraordinary
opinion.105 The opinion was issued in the name of all nine Justices.106 The
Court said that the case
raises questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal
system . . . . It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of
a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders
resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States
107
Constitution.

On the specific legal issue before it, the Court ruled that the disorder in the
school did not justify delaying the desegregation plan. “The constitutional
rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and
disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and
Legislature.”108 Realistically, of course, no other ruling was possible.
Governor Faubus was openly challenging the ruling in Brown; President
Eisenhower, who had been lukewarm in his support of that decision, sent in
troops to enforce desegregation. Especially after it had finally elicited support
from the executive branch, the Court could not possibly have given any sign
that it was backing away from Brown, and it did not.109
As far as the development of the law is concerned, Cooper arguably
established, under the Equal Protection Clause, a principle parallel to one that
is now fairly well established for freedom of speech. In First Amendment law,
the idea is known as the “heckler’s veto”: people opposed to a speaker may
not, by threatening or engaging in disruptive actions, create the harm that
justifies the speaker’s suppression.110 Cooper was an easy case for the parallel
principle because, on the facts of the case as it came to the Court, the harm was
created by the government itself, in the person of Governor Faubus. The reach
of this principle does raise potentially difficult questions, though, if the harms
are significant and fall on innocent third parties (as they often will), and
especially if there is an attenuated or questionable causal connection to the
actions of those seeking to undermine constitutional rights. Be that as it may,
the ruling in Cooper on this point was essentially as straightforward as a legal
matter as it was as a matter of political reality.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4–5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 16.
See KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 328–29.
See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992).
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Although the Court in Cooper explicitly noted that this principle “is
enough to dispose of the case[,]” it went on to discuss “the premise of the
actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding
in the Brown case.”111 The Court then delivered perhaps the strongest
statements in its history in support of what is usually called judicial supremacy.
This part of the Cooper opinion has become more famous, and it is highly
controversial. The Court said that Marbury v. Madison had “declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution . . . . It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of
the land . . . .”112 Further, the Court said, the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution made that interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment “of
binding effect on the States” and their officials, and “[n]o state legislator or
executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating
his [oath] to support it.”113 The Court added that “[t]he principles announced
in [the Brown] decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to
the command of the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the
freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us.”114
The Court seemed to be saying, in this passage, that state officials had an
obligation not just to obey court orders directed to them—Faubus had been
careful never to defy such an order115—but to accept as binding on them the
decisions of the Supreme Court even in cases to which they were not parties.
There is a robust tradition to the contrary.116 Perhaps the most famous
example is President Lincoln’s response to the Dred Scott decision: He agreed
that he had to accept the result in that specific case, but he denied that he had
to accept the principle of the decision.117 So while Dred Scott would be
enslaved, Lincoln did not accept that he had to treat other people identically
situated to Dred Scott as slaves until specific orders were entered in those cases
as well.118
This issue of judicial supremacy is complex and difficult. The Court’s
position in Cooper, taken at face value, seems to go too far; it is difficult to see
why the other branches of government (Cooper’s logic applies not just to the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
FREYER, supra note 6, at 142.
See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
117. Abraham Lincoln, The Dred Scott Decision: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 352–66 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1969).
118. See KRAMER, supra note 116, at 211–12.
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states but to the President and Congress) must instantly acquiesce in the
principles established by Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Constitution, especially when the Court itself remains free to overturn those
decisions. On the other hand, the program of massive resistance to Brown
undertaken by many Southern states also seems unacceptable, and Faubus’s
actions seem totally beyond the pale, even though he never placed himself in
contempt of court.
But those are different issues from the ones surrounding Brown. Cooper
reaffirmed Brown in the most unequivocal terms possible. More important,
though, was the effect that the events in Little Rock—and subsequent events
throughout the South—had on Northern public opinion about Brown and civil
rights generally.
Defenders of Jim Crow laws portrayed segregation as two things. First,
they urged that segregation was an organic component of Southern culture,
entitled to respect as a traditional way of dealing with complex, difficult
matters of race that outsiders could understand imperfectly or not at all.119
Second, they suggested that segregation was essentially benign, an institution
that operated in the best interests of both races.120
The criticisms of Brown made by Wechsler and Arendt, while not
accepting these views entirely, reflect their influence. The linchpin of their
criticisms of Brown was that segregation operated in a way that was essentially
symmetrical; or at least (for Wechsler) the Court had no basis for concluding
otherwise. Some blacks, and some whites, might oppose it, but there was no
reason to say that segregation necessarily treated people unequally. The idea
that segregation was an outgrowth of social norms, not imposed by the state,
was central to Arendt’s argument. And even Wechsler’s account had to
presuppose that segregation served some plausibly legitimate purpose.
It is difficult to see how these views could have survived Little Rock. The
opposition to segregation in Little Rock was not deeply woven into the fabric
of the society; Little Rock was prepared to live with desegregation. The
intense opposition to segregation was the product of political opportunism, not
a sanctified tradition. (C. Vann Woodward, in his classic book The Strange
Career of Jim Crow,121 had sounded similar notes in his account of the initial
establishment of state-enforced segregation in the South.122) Of course the
claim that segregation was a deeply rooted custom would have been more
plausible for Mississippi than for Little Rock. But the point remained that

119. See KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 5–7; James W. Fox Jr., Doctrinal Myths and the
Management of Cognitive Dissonance: Race, Law, and the Supreme Court’s Doctrinal Support of
Jim Crow, 34 STETSON. L. REV. 293, 321 (2005).
120. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 168–69 (3d ed. 1974).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 36–40.
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opportunistic politicians, not just deep social norms, were often behind the Jim
Crow institutions.
More important, Little Rock was a key step in the evolution of opinion in
the North about the malignancy of Jim Crow segregation. The televised
images of frenzied crowds of white adults abusing black schoolchildren were
very dramatic. The effects of these scenes were, of course, reinforced over the
next several years by even more violent and abusive actions in the Deep South
in particular. By the mid-1960s, Northern opinion, no longer in any doubt that
segregation treated African Americans unequally, swung firmly in support of
civil rights legislation,123 and Brown’s status as an icon solidified. Little Rock,
as much as anything, began that progression.
In fact it is hard to understand how Wechsler, writing after Little Rock, and
especially Arendt, writing in direct response to Little Rock, could have said the
things they did about segregation. Arendt’s point that schoolchildren had been
recruited to fight the adults’ battle for them—that point was legitimate, and
troubling. But it is difficult to see how she could have entertained the idea that
there was a symmetry between segregation and integration—that integrating
Central High School was somehow as morally objectionable as what the mobs
did.
Similarly, it was more than understandable for Wechsler to want to draw a
principled line around the Court’s capacity to make sociological judgments
about the effects or significance of major social institutions. That question
about judicial capacity, raised by Wechsler, remains a legitimate one. But
Wechsler’s skepticism about whether segregation really treated blacks as
inferior—his obtuse insistence that the issue was a symmetrical one of freedom
of association—is hard to understand in the aftermath of Little Rock.
Little Rock, in its effects on national opinion, began to solidify the legacy
of Brown; it began to turn Brown into the unchallengeable icon it is today. It is
not out of the question that a more accommodating reception of Brown in the
South might have left Northern support for Brown in the lukewarm state it was
in 1954.124 While it is hard to believe that Brown would ever have been
repudiated, the way in which events played out in Little Rock and, later,
elsewhere in the South—as a conflict between courageous victims asserting
their constitutional rights and the violent defenders of the status quo—helped
make Brown inviolate.

123. WOODWARD, supra note 120, at 186.
124. See KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 421–42.
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III. PARENTS INVOLVED AND THE LEGACY OF BROWN
But if Brown is inviolate, what does it stand for? That was the question
that divided the Court in Parents Involved.125 The answer from history should
have been clear. Brown’s opponents, echoing Plessy, questioned why
segregation constituted unequal treatment at all. Little Rock answered them:
Segregation denied equal protection because segregation as it was then
practiced in the United States was a malevolent device directed at African
Americans. It did not harm blacks and whites equally. The people who
witnessed Little Rock were not witnessing the equal oppression of blacks and
whites. The suggestions to the contrary by Wechsler and, especially, Arendt,
were thoroughly repudiated, and that is why Brown is so well established.
The four Justices in Parents Involved who took the most extreme position
against the use of race claimed, portentously, that they were allowing history to
be heard.126 But their opinion actually says nothing about history. It does not
talk about what segregation was like; it does not talk about Little Rock, or
Selma, or Birmingham, or any of the other events that conveyed to a
previously skeptical public the truth of what Brown, subtly but unmistakably,
said about segregation.
There is in fact much to criticize in the approach taken by the four-Justice
plurality in Parents Involved. To some extent, the problems in the plurality
opinion were present in earlier affirmative actions cases as well. Parents
Involved is notable, though, for several reasons. First, it goes significantly
beyond those earlier decisions in limiting the power of governments to use
racial classifications to overcome de facto segregation. As the dissenters in
Parents Involved noted, for decades it had been taken for granted that the
government could use racial classifications for that purpose if it chose; the only
controversy was over whether the government was obligated to do so.127
Second, the plurality in Parents Involved all but declared that racial
classifications may never be used (although the plurality allowed an exception
for racial classifications that are used to remedy unlawful discrimination by the
government—more on that exception presently).128 The Court has never
before come so close to declaring the use of race unconstitutional across the
board. And third, the tone of the plurality opinion—its overt hostility to the
use of race and its claim of the moral high ground—are different from the
more measured discussions in earlier opinions. In those respects the plurality
opinion is closer to the angry separate opinions written, in earlier cases, by

125. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2783 (2007).
126. See id. at 2767 (“[W]hen it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will
be heard.”).
127. See, e.g., id. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., id. at 2752, 2761 (plurality opinion).
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Justices Thomas and Scalia, who have always taken the position that racial
classifications are unconstitutional in all instances.129
Specifically, Parents Involved is written—in tone as well as substance—as
if Brown’s importance is that it found in the Constitution a provision
forbidding the government from using racial classifications. “It was not the
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the
basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in
1954.”130 Statements like these cry out for a dose of Wechsler’s kind of
skepticism, or Arendt’s—not because those critics were right about Brown, but
because the questions they asked led to an understanding of the basis of
Brown. The Constitution does not contain a provision outlawing racial
classifications. It contains a provision requiring equality in certain realms.
The question asked by Wechsler and Arendt—why and when does the use of
race produce inequality?—still requires an answer. In the aftermath of Brown,
the events at Little Rock and elsewhere in the South showed what that answer
was, when the question was asked about Brown: Jim Crow segregation was an
engine of oppression of blacks. No one can plausibly claim that affirmative
action measures like those challenged in Parents Involved (or any other case,
for that matter) have a comparable effect on whites.
Enough is left, from the era of Brown and Cooper v. Aaron, to indict the
plurality opinion on its own terms (and Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion,
too, which asserts much the same position even more unequivocally, and in
even stronger language).131 The plurality was careful to put aside the use of
racial classifications to remedy past discrimination by the government. That
use of racial classifications, the plurality said, is constitutional.132 The Court
has recognized that point, again and again, so the plurality had no choice but to
acknowledge it. But the plurality just quarantines that “exception”; it does not
try to explain why there is such an exception, or how it might fit with the
principles that the plurality claims were discovered in the Constitution by
Brown.
But if Brown stands for the principle that racial classifications are
pernicious, no matter what, how can a racial classification possibly provide a
remedy for the unlawful use of race? If, as the plurality said, “[t]he way to

129. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“In my view, government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating
on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.”)
(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[G]overnment-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice.”).
130. Parents Invovled, 127 S. Ct. at 2767.
131. Id. at 2782–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. See, e.g., id. at 2752, 2761 (plurality opinion); id. at 2768–69 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race[,]”133 then a remedial exception to the prohibition against racial
classifications, far from being appropriate, would be perverse.
The answer, of course, is that the wrong being remedied is not the use of a
racial classification. That was precisely the point made by the critics of
Brown: You cannot just assert that racial classifications violate the
Constitution. You have to explain why. The point of Brown is that racial
classifications of a certain kind, in a certain context, treat blacks as inferior.
The so-called exception for the remedial use of racial classifications exists
because when racial classifications are used to undo a racial caste system, then
they do not violate the Constitution; indeed, as the Court held in the postBrown era, they may be constitutionally required.134 That supposed exception
is not an exception at all; it is just an application of the basic principle that
racial classifications are unconstitutional when they brand a group as inferior,
and not otherwise.
Brown had a legacy for the nation—that Jim Crow segregation was
unconstitutional and had to end. The Little Rock crisis tested whether that
legacy would survive; in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court insisted on it; eventually,
as the passage of the civil rights acts of the 1960s showed, the nation as a
whole accepted it. But Brown—and Little Rock and Cooper v. Aaron—also
left a legacy for the Supreme Court. Opinions differ about Brown and the
Court’s actions in the subsequent decade that elapsed before the Civil Rights
Act135 and Voting Rights Act136 were passed. It can plausibly be argued that
the Supreme Court, having made a mostly symbolic statement in Brown, stood
on the sidelines and did not really try to play a role in abolishing Jim Crow,
intervening—in Cooper—only to protect its own authority. Be that as it may,
though, Brown created a great moral legacy for the Court. The Court came to
be seen as the institution of the national government that stood up to
segregation. The Court’s justified confidence in the moral rightness of its
position surely helped lead to the strong, and controversial, claims of judicial
supremacy in Cooper.
That legacy, too, has persisted. Judicial supremacy, which was by no
means accepted earlier in our history, has been at a high water mark since the
Civil Rights Era. Today’s Supreme Court is still, in a sense, living off the
moral capital it accumulated in cases like Cooper. The image of the Supreme
Court today, for many people, is still the Supreme Court of Brown and

133. Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion).
134. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2771
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“In such cases, race-based remedial measures are sometimes
required.”).
135. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
136. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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Cooper—not, for example, the Supreme Court of the New Deal Era, which
obstructed popular legislation and was widely criticized. It is an irony, to say
the least, when the Court uses the moral stature that it has acquired in no small
part because of Brown and Little Rock to undermine the true legacy of that
decision and that era.

